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A Structural-Relational Analysis of Party Dynamics in Proxy Wars 
 
Abstract 
 
Proxy wars are still under-represented in conflict research and a key cause for this is the 
lack of conceptual and terminological care. This article seeks to demonstrate that 
minimizing terminological diffusion increases overall analytical stability by maximising 
conceptual rigor. The argument opens with a discussion on the terminological ambivalence 
resulting from the haphazard employment of labels referencing the parties involved in 
proxy wars. Here, the article introduces an analytical framework with a two-fold aim: to 
reduce label heterogeneity, and to argue in favour of understanding proxy war dynamics as 
overlapping dyads between a Beneficiary, a Proxy, and a Target. This is then applied to the 
issues of defining and theorising party dynamics in proxy wars. It does so by providing a 
structural-relational analysis of the interactions between the above-mentioned parties based 
on strategic interaction. It presents a tentative explanation of the proxy relationship by 
correlating the Beneficiary’s goal towards the Target with the Proxy’s preference for the 
Beneficiary. In adding the goal-preference relational heuristic, the article advances the 
recent focus on strategic interaction with a novel variant to explanations based on interest, 
power, cost-benefit considerations, or ideology.  
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Introduction 
 
Conceptual debates stand to correct theoretical and methodological ambivalences 
across a wide range of sub-fields in international relations. Often disregarded as meta-
theoretical trivia
1
, concept analyses focus on the perils of operating with notions with unclear 
boundaries, conflicting meanings, and divergent empirical referents. Their aims are 
straightforward: attaining clarity, ensuring precision, and building stable conceptual 
standing(s). Security
2
, terrorism
3
, and war
4
 are a small sample of terms subjected to 
conceptual scrutiny in the discipline of international relations. Nevertheless, even 
established research clusters, such as that addressing civil war, still use concepts 
inconsistently and imperfectly
5
. Given the nascent state of proxy wars research, it comes as 
no surprise that such discussions are almost entirely absent, despite having important 
consequences to our understanding of the topic, chiefly of which their effect on knowledge 
cumulation
6
. 
As recently noted by Brown, ‘the issue of proxy warfare has again been rising up 
the international agenda’7. Notwithstanding the erroneous overlap between proxy warfare 
and proxy war
8
, Brown highlights the growing interest in the topic
9
. As the gap in the 
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knowledge of proxy wars slowly narrows, it is striking to note, however, that this cluster of 
research is still at a critical, pre-theoretical stage. For example, attempts at theoretical 
examinations of causal dynamics in proxy wars are rather scarce. On the one hand, 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham put forward a theory of external support hinging on 
principal-agent assumptions and a demand-supply logic
10
. On the other, San-Akca 
developed a strategic interaction model involving two simultaneous selection pathways: 
from the state towards the non-state actor, and from the non-state actor towards the state
11
. 
These are complemented by country- or region-focused research which reveals interesting, 
albeit partial, insights into why proxy wars are waged
12
. However, no overarching theory has 
emerged, and the existing models complement, rather than integrate each other.  
This article argues that a first step in overcoming this issue is a joint terminological-
conceptual exploration of the term ‘proxy war’. Essentially, the article focuses on 
conceptual assessment as constitutive of the theoretical micro-foundations of proxy war 
research. However, for proxy wars, this is not as straightforward, for conceptual inquiry 
requires a deconstruction of the meaning of proxy wars as acts of violence taking the form 
of indirect intervention. As Mumford put it, proxy wars are indirect third-party engagements 
in conflicts aimed at influencing strategic outcomes. They are constitutive of ‘a relationship 
between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing 
conflict, and their chosen proxies who are the conduit for weapons, training and funding 
from the benefactor’13. From a conceptual point of view, this implies ordering meaning 
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across the complex interactions resulting between the party requiring indirect intervention, 
the party carrying it out, and the actual target of indirect intervention.  
Nevertheless, it is at this level that research has produced a theoretically misleading 
terminological diffusion. Specifically, the three parties engaged in proxy wars display 
extraordinary label variance that not only presents limited substantive utility but adds 
unnecessary polemic to an already contentious topic. In the literature, the use of labels has 
followed the path of adapting terminology into ‘novel’ conceptualisations of proxy wars: 
choices over pairs of labels, for example, ‘patron’ - ‘client’ or ‘benefactor’ - ‘pawn’, are 
usually deemed semantically sufficient to mark conceptual innovation. This is a significant 
issue and the argument the article makes is simple, yet relevant: by minimising and reducing 
the semantically crowded field of labels ascribed to the parties involved in proxy wars, we 
develop a more stable and easily definable concept, allowing it to maximise both academic 
and policy tract.  
An emphasis on the semantics surrounding the notion of ‘proxy war’ matters 
because we are still ‘conceptually under-equipped to grasp, let alone counter, violent 
political challenges.’14 By questioning the language we use to assess proxy wars, this article 
firstly taps into the recent turn towards conceptual analyses of violence-related phenomena. 
For example, the study of counterinsurgency has been subject to conceptual reassessment. 
On the one hand, there have been attempts to apply a unifying conceptual approach to 
counterinsurgency under the rubric of ‘violent politics’ that would link strategies to shifts in 
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warfare.
15
 On the other, the increasing reliance on delegative strategies – military, political, 
operational, technological – led Waldman to introduce the notion of ‘vicarious warfare’.16  
Second, a focus on semantics matters because language, as Fierke put it, has a central role 
in how we analyse and communicate about the world.
17
 It is through language that one 
selects not just a name for the observed phenomenon, but where it starts and ends, as well 
as how one understands and explains it.
18
 More importantly, as names, labels, or 
terminologies are assigned to phenomena a series of normative, epistemological, and 
ontological associations are attached to the named subject.
19
  Yet, these concerns are usually 
ignored either because they are buried within methodological/theoretical predilections or 
because the concept itself is seen as largely self-evident. ‘Proxy war’ is far from being a self-
evident concept and attaining some form of conceptual and terminological determinacy is 
crucial to moving the debate forward. 
Finally, a focus on the terminology-concept links offers a window into smoother 
practitioner cooperation. No matter how specialised a concept is, it manages to permeate 
the public and popular discourse
20
, and this is evident about proxy wars. In his last news 
conference, former United States President, Barak Obama, heavily criticised Russian proxy 
aggression
21
. His Vice-President, Joe Biden, questioned the future of America’s Middle 
Eastern alliances, arguing that historically stable allies have transformed the Syrian civil war 
into a proxy Sunni-Shia war
22
. As ‘proxy war’ gains discursive tract it is our task as 
researchers to provide policymakers with the necessary vocabulary to have an informed 
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debate.
23
 This effort rests on clear concepts, and any degree of clarity is reached though 
language. Nathan Canestaro’s argument provided a critique of the academic-practitioner 
dialogue regarding civil war definition
24
, and the key conclusion was that policymakers are 
most concerned with labelling and with the implications of politically loaded terms. In her 
memoirs, former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, recalls the decisive role of language 
in reaching a diplomatic agreement over potential ceasefires in Syria with Russia: ‘It’s easy 
to get lost in the semantics, but words, […], shaped how the rest of the world received our 
agreement and how it was understood on the ground in Syria’25. As such, the aims of the 
article tackle a crucial problem which affects how proxy wars are defined, operationalised, 
and theorised, and, subsequently, research’s ability to become policy relevant.  
The article is developed across two sections whose empirical background is offered 
by the contemporary spread of proxy wars across the Middle East. Notwithstanding the 
forceful direct Russian military intervention in Syria, events in the region show how a wide 
range of actors now find themselves benefitting from the strategic utility of proxies. The 
scale of the problem was remarked by US President, Barak Obama, who explained his 
reluctance to act in Syria by employing the same variance in labels that informs the article’s 
puzzle:  
 
‘[you had] a military superpower in Russia prepared to do whatever it took to keep its client-state 
involved, and [you had] a regional military power in Iran that saw their own vital strategic interests at 
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stake and were willing to send in as many of their people or proxies to support the regime [emphasis 
added].’26 
 
The first section presents a terminological assessment designed to reduce 
heterogeneity of labels by identifying problems resulting from their interchangeable use. It 
introduces the analytical framework and then attempts a corrective measure by building a 
case for the employment of a connotative-free set of labels: Beneficiary, Proxy, and Target. 
The second part of the article demonstrates the utility of minimizing terminological reach 
on overall conceptual rigor. The article relocates the definition of the term ‘proxy war’ on 
a strategic interaction footing by providing a structural-relational analysis of the dynamics 
between the abovementioned parties. It explains this relationship as the strategic correlation 
between the Beneficiary’s goal in relation to the Target and the Proxy’s preference for the 
Beneficiary. By introducing the goal-preference heuristic, the article pushes the debate 
further by allowing a closer analysis of strategic behaviour from a different angle. Simply 
put, while San-Acka presents a selection model between supporter and supported, I 
propose one in which the choice of proxy is dependent on the target, and the willingness 
of the proxy to accept delegation of violence is formulated by its preference, or lack thereof, 
for its supporter. This presents the essence of the phenomenon as a process resulting from 
complex, relational, and politico-strategic interaction as opposed to one based on interest, 
power, cost-benefit considerations, or ideology. 
Minimizing Terminological Reach 
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To begin with, it is important to note that proxy wars have been studied across 
several research clusters dealing directly or indirectly with the topic: Cold War 
historiography
27
, intelligence studies
28
, and the emerging research on external support and 
proxy wars
29
. The latter now also includes research on external support and its effects on 
group cohesion and performance
30
, the role of proxy actors in electoral violence
31
, and war 
termination.
32
 Adding to this is the study of proxy actors as key operatives of military purges
33
 
and wartime sexual violence
34
, and, finally, as swapping roles and functions with (other) non-
state actors, most notably, militias
35
. Taken together, these mark a much-needed 
progression in our understanding of the phenomena of war by proxy, hitherto classed as 
understudied
36
.  
However, this cross-cluster dissemination is relevant to the terminological and 
conceptual problem discussed here because it points to its endogenous nature. Do different 
foci require and, therefore, produce different conceptual alternatives for the parties 
engaged in proxy wars? Or does conceptual plurality in fact inhibit unified scholarly debate? 
Endogeneity appears then, not only to simply preclude this analysis, but to also be an 
intrinsic part of it. In doing so, it can simultaneously deter conceptual analysis by offering 
the easy way out of calling ‘proxy war’ an essentially contested concept37, or it can become 
a matter of puzzlement. Against this background, I treat terminological pluralism and its 
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effects on conceptual rigor as a curious quandary by reflecting only on the literatures dealing 
with external support and proxy wars.  
In proxy war research, terminology does not concern the label for the phenomenon 
itself, but those applicable to the parties involved in proxy wars: the party requiring indirect 
intervention, the party providing indirect intervention, and the party acted upon through 
indirect intervention. This interplay of actors is, in fact, consistently represented in the 
literature. Like Mumford’s definition, Hughes conceptualises proxy wars as an arrangement 
where a party ‘helps’ a third one, ‘particularly if the latter is fighting an adversarial power 
(or target)’38. Salehyan argues a similar point and presents proxy war dynamics as an 
example of security delegation ‘where a principal (the patron state) empowers an agent (the 
rebel group) to carry out some foreign policy objective’39. Other understandings of proxy 
wars rest on the same assumption
40
. For example, Lamb defines proxy wars as the provision 
of external support to a warring party
41
. This allows Lamb to explain proxy wars as a 
relationship of ‘collusion between the patron and the proxy’, where ‘collusion’ is used to 
capture the covert and interest-based nature of the proxy relationship
42
. Recently, Staniland 
developed the concept of ‘collusion’ to frame ‘cooperation between state and militia in 
pursuit of shared interests’43. 
Nevertheless, what is inconsistent in the literature, and can be easily noted above, 
is the terminology employed in relation to each of the three parties. First, the party 
requesting indirect military intervention has been referred to as ‘activator’44, ‘benefactor’45, 
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‘patron’46, ‘principal’47, ‘superpower-patron’48, and ‘sponsor’49. Second, the party providing 
the indirect military intervention has been label as ‘client’50, ‘pawn’51, ‘proxy’52, ‘pseudo-
volunteers’53, ‘puppet’54, ‘satellite’55; ‘subordinate’56; ‘surrogate’57, ‘superclient’58, ‘tool’59, and 
‘volunteer’60. Third, the party being acted upon through indirect intervention has been 
called ‘adversary’61, ‘opposition’62, and ‘target’63.  
This section of the article challenges the need for this excessive heterogeneity of 
labels arguing that terminological shifts affect the overall meaning of ‘proxy war’ by assigning 
meaning and value ex ante. This problem underscores the importance of this discussion 
on the semantics surrounding proxy wars because the employment of such a terminological 
roster assigns plural ontological and epistemological meanings to the overall concept. This 
section seeks to establish an optimal use of labels that minimizes the terminological reach 
and sets the basis for achieving stronger conceptual rigor. It introduces a framework aimed 
at determining a pairing of labels that speak to what the literature has agreed is a stable set 
of properties of proxy wars – third party, indirect intervention – while underlying the 
interactive and mutually constitutive nature of relationship. The framework includes two 
criteria: normative endorsement, and relational enforcement. I classify the first one in ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ categories, and the second into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, operationalization 
explained below.  
In political science, normative benchmarks and choices over theoretical schools or 
frameworks have significant bearing on the phenomena to which they are applied. The 
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criterion of endorsement explores the links between ‘proxy war’ and the usual tendency to 
normatively embed the phenomenon in the ideological fabric of the Cold War. Bar-Siman 
Tov’s terminological choices make a case in point: the Activator-Proxy relationship is an 
expression of power which ultimately allows the achievement of the Activator’s strategic 
goals and political interests at a lower level of risk, irrespective of the role and position of 
the proxy
64
. This has become a standard depiction of a proxy, and some of the earliest 
analyses of the Syrian proxy wars drew immediate comparisons to superpower adventurism 
in the Third World, claiming that the American-Russian approach to Syria was of Cold 
War essence
65
. This is a problem because it positions an incompatibility in a faulty 
theoretical framework without any discussion of either party’s goals. More importantly, it 
falls victim to the same unwarranted politicisation of explanations which the article 
presented as rationale for the need of semantic analysis. 
As a classificatory criterion, endorsement is rooted in Freeden’s notions of 
‘ideological morphology’ and ‘thought edifices’ which reference a concept’s frame of 
political conduct and action by linking word and meaning ‘with a particular conception of 
human nature, a particular conception of social structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority’66. 
I focus on ideological normativity because of an existing bias in proxy wars research towards 
presenting the term as ideologically confined to superpower rivalry. Because of the long 
history of proxy wars during the Cold War, research has tended to reject ex ante the 
potential ability of the concept of ‘proxy wars’ to capture the realities of twenty-first century 
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violence
67
. This complaint is also made by Tamm
68
 and San-Akca
69
 in whose understanding, 
‘proxy war’ seems to be supra-rationalised by the Cold War ideological struggle as a ‘virtual 
freeze-frame’70. Because of this, assessing label accuracy through the lens of its normative 
prescriptiveness helps determine conceptual clarity outside the West-East Cold War 
framework. By reflecting on normativity, the framework filters labels by presenting an 
accurately contextualised concept useful for both research and policy.   
Complementing the evaluation of normative prescription, is the second criterion:  
existence or absence of control levels between the supporting and receiving parties. 
Endorsement is matched by enforcement, understood as the ability of a label to imply 
negative or positive enforcement of control in the proxy war relationship: negative implying 
total subordination, positive marking a cooperative relationship along the lines of 
collusion
71
. This is intended to identify labels that reflect the strategic interaction between 
the parties, rather than labels that assign the role of proxy as an attribute. This point was 
made recently by Walt, who, in addressing the violence in the Middle East, commented on 
the specific issue of control: ‘Iran does not control these groups [Hezbollah and Shia 
militias] any more than the United States controls its own Middle East clients’72.  
The endorsement-enforcement framework is presented in the matrix below. The 
most commonly used labels, ‘patron’ and ‘principal’, on one side, and ‘client’ and ‘pawn’ 
on the other, show both a high ideological endorsement and a negative enforcement on 
control. All the four are value laden labels and translate the powerful West-East ideological 
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divide: ‘patron’ and ‘principal’ show general concerns for attaining hegemony, while ‘client’ 
and ‘pawn’ point to the search for bipolar alignment. Their weak ability to capture accurate 
relational dynamic is demonstrated, for example, by the Syria-Soviet Union/Russia 
relationship, which even under the auspices of the superpower competition was far from 
being static and unidirectional. First, at the turn of the 1970s, Syria was ‘wooed assiduously’ 
by the Soviet leadership
73
 given its starch determination to refuse to endorse US Secretary 
of State William Rogers’s 1970 peace initiative which had Moscow’s blessing. For the 
USSR, Syria allowed the Soviets to check both Turkey and Israel, while providing a link to 
Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, both sides retained a clear understanding of existing levels 
of incompatibility between the two sides’ strategic goals, which Foreign Minister Gromyko 
decisively, and repeatedly, relayed to Hafiz al-Assad
74
. As such, treating Syria as a mere 
client for the ‘big power patron’ implied a deterministic and compliant top down 
relationship that was far from accurate and that developed beyond mere clientelism. Even 
in the context of the ongoing Syrian civil war, the Syrian-Russian relationship posed policy 
dilemmas that replicated the same Cold War mentality. Following the Russian intervention 
in Syria, President Obama claimed ‘Putin had to go into Syria not out of strength but out 
of weakness, because his client Mr. Assad was crumbling.’75 We see here the relevance of 
semantics in framing policy, for Obama’s client comments were as much insight into as they 
were defence of his vacillation over American intervention in Syria
76
. In this context, 
however, the Syria-Russia relationship has evolved as a complicated alliance in which each 
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parties’ goals exerted reciprocal leverage.77 If Syria’s aim was regime preservation at all costs, 
Russia aims were threefold: to counter the domestic pressures of terrorist threats; to embed 
Russia in the regional economy, and to restore its status internationally by gaining the 
bargaining position in the Levant having demonstrated the failures of West in the region
78
.  
 
[INSERT Table 1. Minimizing Terminological Reach HERE] 
 
Second, ‘principal’, ‘sponsor’, ‘surrogate’, and ‘satellite’ relax the assumption of 
subordination in the proxy relationship, but still display a similarly high ideological 
endorsement which positions proxy wars again under the remit of Cold War interactions. 
Of concern are also the implications brought by ‘activator’, ‘subordinate’ and ‘tool’ because, 
despite allowing proxy wars to move beyond the Cold War debate, the labels reduce the 
proxy’s ability to represent its interests in the overall proxy relationship by emphasising a 
negative endorsement of control. Recent research into the Middle East succumbed to this 
vision of denying agency to regional and local actors by relegating them as secondary actors 
in shadow wars
79
. This is rather problematic. First, it ignores the possibility of blowback, 
agency slack, or issues with moral hazard. As Cockburn put it, some actors on the ground 
are ‘incompetent, corrupt, or simply crazed’80. Second, it also ignores local third parties and 
their local agendas. In 2015, Hamas momentarily left the Iranian strategic orbit and began 
cultivating ties with Saudi Arabia, leaving Iran to shift its support to the newly emerging al 
Sabirin movement
81
. The policy debate on sponsoring rebels in Syria during 2012 and 2013 
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followed a logic seeking to identify actors that had ‘skin in the game already’82, ignoring, 
however, the ability of the many rebel groups not only to evade ‘imposed’ direction but 
chart their own strategic path. A clear example was the fact that many groups began working 
with Jabhat al-Nusra based on their own strategic considerations.  
The labels become less restrictive once a joint level of low ideological endorsement, 
and a positive enforcement of control is reached. This is where minimising terminological 
reach becomes useful: the labels ‘benefactor’, ‘agent’, or ‘proxy’ manage to frame the 
constitution of a proxy relationship in a more nuances way by emphasising party agency 
and interaction. Hezbollah allows for the development of this point very clearly, both pre- 
and post-Cold War. Its relationship with Iran and Syria came to be talked about exclusively 
in terms of proxyship
83
, as Hezbollah moved from controlled third party under Hafez al-
Assad, to strategic partner under Bashar-al Assad, whilst developing almost symbiotic ties 
with the Iranian regime
84
. 
Hezbollah emerged as an alternative to the perennially disenfranchised Lebanese 
Shia communities, which in the middle of the 1970s found a faint representation in a group 
called Amal, initially led by a Shia cleric, Musa Al-Sadr. The advent of the Lebanese civil 
war and Israel’s 1982 intervention saw a spiralling of intra and inter group violent dynamics. 
Hezbollah presented an alternative to Amal which had already began collaborating with the 
Lebanese government, thus furthering Shia discontent. For Syria and Iran, Hezbollah 
became a vessel to channel their intrinsic hostility towards Israel and the Lebanese 
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governments. As Byman put it, ‘for both countries, using Hezbollah as a proxy allowed 
some degree of deniability, enabling them to strike at Israel’85. Hezbollah translated Iranian 
backing into much needed organisational strength and ideological clout and benefitted from 
Syria’s role as a conduit of weapons, logistical support, and money, as well as its ability to 
crack down on rivals in Lebanon. The relationships fluctuated, showing how Hezbollah 
should not be labelled as a mere pawn or client. As Iran failed to win decisively against Iraq, 
Hezbollah distanced itself from the Islamist regime, and aligned itself more with Syria 
whose position was determined by its own goal of overcoming international isolation and 
regime preservation. Hezbollah abandoned its initial goals of transforming Lebanon in 
fundamentally religious state, and it transitioned from a ‘ragtag collection of Shiite fighters’86 
into a key strategic proxy actor across the Middle East, itself able to establish proxy 
relationships. More recently, its relationship to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
has been portrayed in such terms, with reports of the group trying set out its very own proxy, 
the Return Brigades
87
.  
Given this brief, albeit telling, example, the article attempts to bridge the need for 
minimizing terminological reach with that of maximising conceptual rigor, by presenting a 
set of labels able to harness analytical power of the endorsement-enforcement spectrum. It 
proposes that parties engaged in proxy wars be labelled in the following way: the party 
requesting indirect intervention as ‘beneficiary’, the party providing indirect intervention as 
‘proxy’, and the party being acted upon through indirect intervention as ‘target’. The 
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changes are minor, yet significant, and are not a matter of simple stylistic choice. Given the 
Russian refusal to portray the Syrian situation as a civil war and its instance on labelling 
rebel groups as terrorists, clarity over terminology seems more important than ever.  
The choice of ‘beneficiary’ is justified in the light of the fact that Mumford’s 
‘benefactor’ is one-dimensional: the meaning of ‘benefactor’ is oriented more toward the 
party’s responsibility for the Proxy. This is also the case of Salehyan’s use of ‘Principal’. 
Using ‘beneficiary’ links the party proving support to the overall aims of the delegation of 
violence in relation to the Target, while not denying the Proxy a degree of self-orientation. 
The label ‘Proxy’ is used as it is the least connotative on the endorsement-enforcement 
scale in comparison with that of ‘client’, ‘subordinate’, ‘pawn’ or ‘satellite’. Lastly, the notion 
of ‘target’ is consistent with San-Akca’s emphasis on its value to strategic interaction88. This 
separates the notion from that of a normal proxy target which is a party that becomes a 
target only through proximity to the conflict. Thus, the use of ‘beneficiary’, ‘proxy’ and 
‘target’ highlights the triadic interactions as the core of the phenomenon described by the 
concept of ‘proxy war’ in a connotation-free and more nuanced way.  
 
Maximizing Conceptual Rigor: Explaining Party Dynamics in Proxy Wars 
 
The terminological system presented previously helps maximise the term’s rigor by 
shifting the focus on the interactions that form the core of the phenomenon: the triadic 
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Beneficiary-Proxy-Target relationship. In doing so it invites a reconsideration of how we 
define and explain proxy wars. This section discusses how terminological stability translates 
into conceptual clarity by, firstly, proposing a working definition for proxy wars, and, 
secondly, carrying out a structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars to aid 
the debate on causal explanations.  
I define a proxy war as a violent armed interaction resulting from the polarization 
of competing political goals between two organised parties, a Beneficiary and a Target, in 
which at least one party engages the other indirectly in sustained collective violence through 
a third party, the Proxy. First, the definition establishes a set of core features of the 
phenomenon: the third party, indirect intervention, and relational interaction. Second, it 
allows to analytically differentiate proxy wars as acts of violence in the light of their chronic 
misrepresentation in conflict research. By emphasising violence, this definition reflects on 
proxy wars as warring events resulting from three overlapping dyads: the Beneficiary-Target 
dyad; the Beneficiary-Proxy dyad; and the Proxy-Target dyad. What constitutes a proxy war 
is the indirect projection of violence onto the Beneficiary-Target dyad via the Proxy-Target 
dyad through the Beneficiary-Proxy dyad. 
The correlations between the three dyads, however, is something the literature has 
pointed out, especially with the recent work by San-Acka. Even more so, it has presented 
this by focusing on strategic interaction. To clarify, ‘strategic interaction’ refers to the 
correlation between one’s alternatives and choices with those of other actors89. To better 
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articulate our understanding of this complex relational triad, the article sketches a tentative 
explanation of how proxy dynamics come about. Because explanations have so far been 
reduced to an interest-power rationale
90
, strategic interaction captures the deep structures 
of relational interaction, and not the thin layers of actor-assigned considerations, such as 
risk management, power, or cost-effectiveness.   
  Drawing on the advantages of semantic clarity, the relationship underling by the 
notion of ‘proxy war’ can be understood as the correlation between the strategic 
configuration of the Beneficiary’s goal towards the Target, and the Proxy’s preference 
relative to the Beneficiary. This bridges two dimensions: the Beneficiary-Target 
relationship, with a focus on the Beneficiary’s desired outcome/goal towards the Target; 
and the Proxy’s willingness to distribute violence against the Target based on a preference 
for the Beneficiary. Because a thorough examination of the goal-preference spectrum 
exceeds the space of this article, goals are defined as ends to be achieved, and preferences 
as attitudinal or behavioural (pre)-dispositions towards a type of action or actor.  
Goals structure the Beneficiary’s role in the dynamic by setting a Target-related end, 
and preferences optimize the Proxy’s position vis-a-vis the Target. This is consistent with 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham’s observation that indirect intervention is 
conditioned by the intervener’s motivation as well as their potential options for doing so. 
More so, it draws on Gleditsch’s observations that the transnational dimensions of civil wars 
result not just from direct contagion, but also through actor-specific mechanisms
91
, and 
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reiterates Salehyan’s emphasis that the relationship should be understood as a variant of a 
strategic partnership
92
. It differs, however, from San-Akca’s recent theorisation which 
presented a simultaneous, two-tiered selection mechanism: from supporting state to proxy, 
and from proxy to supporting state.  
By emphasising the role of the Proxy’s preference, the article’s contribution 
reaffirms San-Akca’s second ‘selection’ dynamic. It also brings the Proxy into the centre of 
causal explanations as an attempt to capture actor agency and the inherent variation of why 
it accepts delegation of violence. It is important to note that in the absence of the proposed 
terminological assessment, both the agency and variation of the Proxy’s motivation would 
struggle to gain causal weight due to the implications of subordination implied by labels 
such as ‘client’, ‘pawn’, or ‘puppet’. As such, instead of framing their participation as 
motived by goals, I contend that preferences are a stronger explanatory variant because, 
most often, the Proxy is already in a clearly defined antagonist relationship with the Target. 
In most cases, proxy wars unfold against the background of on-going wars where the Proxy-
Target relationship is set.  
The complexity of the Syrian civil war shows this accurately with the rebels receiving 
support already being involved in a strategic contest with the government and with each 
other. The United Nations’ middleman in Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, characterised the 
situation in Syria by noting this exact overlap, namely that the war ‘is at the same time, a 
civil war, a sectarian war and a proxy war.’93 This was made possible by regional dynamics 
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which have exerted a powerful pull on the conflict: the Turkish bid for neo-Ottomanism
94
, 
the Iranian-Saudi Arabia rivalry,
95
 Israel’s pursuit for security at a time of Iranian push for 
hegemony
96
, and a growing realisation by Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi 
Arabia of the diminishing prospects of externally guaranteed security. As such, by July 2018, 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) had become Turkey’s proxy, the Kurds had assumed their 
historical proxy partnership with the United States going back the 1970s, and Iran had 
employed a vast network of proxy militias manned and trained by Hezbollah to transform 
Syria into an outpost of Iranian power.
97
 To see the analytical value of preference in this 
context, consider the example of the Kurds. In assuming the role of proxies
98
, the armed-
branches of the various Kurdish factions across Syria acted on a manifested preference for 
the Unites States. The Obama administration considered the Kurds to be a trusted ‘partner’ 
to fight ISIS
99
, and the Trump administration continued cooperation with them as ‘foreign 
partners’100. In doing so, the Kurds exchanged strategic utility for political recognition and 
legitimization which has been crucial in maintaining a supposed distance from the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and managing the Turkish opposition to their territorial 
claims.
101
 For its part, Turkey co-opted factions of the Iraqi Kurds as a proxy counterweight 
to the emerging Rojava territorial formation at its border with Syria
102
. 
The example of the Kurds also shows that preference does not imply proxies do 
not seek specific aims. In fact, preference presents an opportunity to differentiate between 
purely selfish reasons and more complex strategic associations. The first category would 
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reference Tamm’s recent insights into the role of survival and financial gain in African civil 
wars experiencing external support
103
. The second references the pull the issue of ethnic or 
religion kin has in the provision of support
104
, and is best exemplified by Hezbollah and 
Iran. Their relationship draws on the distinct power of the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or 
the guardianship of the jurist in the person of the Ayatollah. As previously mentioned, the 
relationship has been anything but linear. However, velayat-e faqit is a marker of distinct 
preference which has allowed the group to develop into a legitimate political party, and, in 
this process, to outgrow its relationship with Syria. Here we observe again the need for clear 
terminologies and its impact on definition and explanation: having operated under the 
assumption that Hezbollah was merely a Syrian or Iranian ‘pawn’, would have reduced our 
ability to explain its role and links in the region. Its current involvement in the Syrian civil 
war is strategically relevant to the group itself. It is not strategically coerced by its 
current/former ‘mentor’, but rather the result of a preference towards the Ayatollah’s 
strategic vision for the Middle East in which Syria and Lebanon are key for maintaining a 
line of defence against Israel and Saudi Arabia. 
If preferences help to account for Proxy choices, by focusing on the Beneficiary’s 
goals, we can better integrate the literature’s typological efforts to understand the rationale 
for delegating violence, ranging from influence, destabilisation, or retaliation
105
. Despite 
being acknowledged by San-Akca, it is not included in her selection theory which only looks 
at ‘various paths to collaboration between states and rebel groups’106. As such, this article 
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adds the relationship between the supporting state and its desired target as an additional 
key insight making it a significant contribution resulting from the terminological assessment 
and its emphasis on the recognition of the Target as integral to the proxy war process. This 
shifts the current explanation of the decision to delegate violence from focusing on the 
Proxy to focusing on the Target.  
The reason is that the historical evolution of proxy wars has shown how little 
consideration supporting states have for proxies. The clearest support for this statement 
was offered by the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in her striking 
admission in 2005 of America’s long record of sponsoring tyrants for more than six 
decades
107
. A careful reading of US and Soviet Cold War proxy wars shows how little 
preference mattered for the Beneficiary. The US proxy war pattern is quite striking: in the 
Philippines it supported the upper class ilustrados; in Afghanistan, the mujahedeen set the 
scene for the twenty-first century’s biggest security challenge; and in Latin America, thuggish 
rebel groups made Nixon realise that, as Kissinger put it, “the imperative of geopolitical 
equilibrium overrode the demands of ideological purity”108. 
The current developments of proxy wars in the Middle East underscore the 
supporting states’ focus on the target, and not on the Proxy. In Gaza, as Hamas attempted 
a strategic relocation in the Saudi camp, Iran wasted no time to start channelling funding to 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the al Sabirin group as proxies against Israel. In its 
relationship to Hezbollah, Syria sought to regain control over Lebanon and to set up a 
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buffer against Israel. Its focus on goals, rather than preference, explains the mechanical 
relationship Hafez al-Assad developed with Hezbollah which the Alawite attempted to rein 
by pitting other local actors against it whenever the group acted in its own interests
109
.  As 
discussed above, the Syrian civil war has seen staggering regional intervention all informed 
by individual goals, and not commitments to rebel causes.  
Turkey’s interest in supporting the FSA placed Syria second to the existential threat 
the PKK pose. Saudi Arab willingness and quick reaction to rebel needs is linked to Iranian 
rivalry rather than to the prospects of a democratic country.
110
 Similarly, Iran has focused 
on Syria as the collapse of the regime would leave Iran exposed in its confrontation with 
regional enemies, directly affect its ability to provide support to Hezbollah, and thwart the 
country’s naval ambitions111. Finally, while Russia proceeded with a direct military 
intervention aimed at projecting a long-sought power-broker status at the international level, 
the United States oscillated on the issue of rebel support, and after initial reluctance, opted 
for a covert operation centred on the FSA and the armed wings of the Kurds. The decision 
involved a process of vetting which could be understood as preference, but as Clinton 
explained, it was the fear of blowback and the publication of a CIA report on the long 
history of failed proxy wars that informed the decision not to provide support
112
. The 
reliance on Kurdish forces ultimately provided what Bernard-Henri Lévy’s called ‘no 
sorrier spectacle’113, and is aptly explained by the notion of Beneficiary goal. Focused on 
developing a counterinsurgency strategy to fight ISIS, the US divorced this issue from the 
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context in which it emerged. As such, it enlisted the Kurds in an effort considered both 
inconsistent and highly conditional, but accepted, as explained, through a high preference 
for the United States.
114
 With the Trump administration now committed to withdrawing 
from Syria, the future of the civil war is left to the Turkey-Iranian-Russian triumvirate. 
However, any plan of moving forward must consider the wider regional implications given 
the pressures of a counterpoise from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, 
all employing their own proxies. 
The Middle Eastern cauldron of proxy wars shows how the goal-preference 
heuristic presents the problem as constitutive of heterarchical relationships, and not 
hierarchical ones. In doing so it removes subordination and compliance, restoring much 
needed internal coherence to the idea of ‘proxy war’. It provides a clearer sense of the how 
the dynamics between parties involved in proxy wars come about, allowing future research 
to turn to explaining other issues such as the conditions that make it more likely to take 
shape, and, most importantly, its consequences.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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When Coker wondered about the role of language in political concepts he asked a 
simple question, ‘What’s in a name?’. His answer was as short and relevant as the question 
itself: ‘Plenty’115. The advantage of this discussion is that it linked two systems often ignored 
in relation to security matters: the terminological one and the conceptual one. This analysis 
of proxy wars deconstructed a long-standing misunderstanding in the study of delegation of 
violence, namely its messy vernacular and its effects on the properties of the concept it 
describes. The overall aim was not to add more to exciting jargon, but to add a much-
needed layer of reflection on how we conceptualise and theorise proxy wars as a 
contemporary security challenge.  
First, the discussion evaluated the terminological roster of labels used to 
characterise the parties engaged in proxy wars. A focus on the proxy war lexicon addressed 
the fact that process of naming and selecting terminology imports substantive value to the 
concept itself, to the framework developed to assess it, and to the range of solutions we 
seek to answer it.
116 The aim was to demonstrate that lack of semantic precision influences 
the overall concept, its definition, and its utility. To do so, the article developed the 
endorsement-enforcement matrix from the assumption that ‘political concepts are doubly 
related to a socio-linguistical context from which they emanate and which they seek to 
interpret and shape’.117 Applied to the literature on proxy war and external supposed it 
showed the inadequacy of the existing lexicon. By making the case for the use of 
‘beneficiary’, ‘proxy’, and ‘target’, the article paved the way for further theory building able 
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to advance the debate and answer relevant policy questions. The need for such an analysis 
was nowhere more evident than in the remarks of former British Foreign Secretary, Boris 
Johnson, who accused Iran and Saudi Arabia of ‘puppeteering and playing proxy wars’118, 
creating a cabinet impasse that jeopardised the British strategy towards the Syrian civil war.  
Johnson’s remarks show that language is a powerful tool with a tremendously 
transformative power, and the analysis used the endorsement-enforcement matrix to show 
how choices over labels in proxy wars became choices over the definition and explanation 
of the phenomenon itself. The article addressed this problem by drawing a theoretical 
framework that added the goal-preference heuristic to the current discussion on causality. 
This shifted the discussion to the essence of the matter, the triadic strategic interaction. 
More importantly, in introducing the preference-goal heuristic, the article offers a vantage 
point from which future research can develop. The article’s empirical backbone was the 
complex set of Middle Eastern proxy wars, and this showed how varied the extent of waging 
proxy wars can be. As John Bew put it, ‘much dry tinder remains in these overlapping proxy 
wars’119 with these conflicts engulfing local, sub-national, national, regional, and international 
actors. Nevertheless, the structural-relational analysis of proxy war party dynamics is a step 
forward because it helps open a more in-depth inquiry into proxy wars. One such potential 
avenue is the comparative assessment of why states wage proxy wars starting from the goal-
preference heuristic. By developing a range of goals and by setting up degrees of preference, 
future research can set forth a more comprehensive typology of logics of violence behind 
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waging proxy wars. This will no doubt move both research and policy closer to developing 
strategies to confront and counter the messy military and political realities of proxy wars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Minimizing Terminological Reach 
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